
How Claude Code's Convenience Feature Silently Leaked 1,379 Secrets Into Public GitHub Repositories
In November 2026, software security firm Apiiro disclosed that Anthropic's Claude Code AI coding assistant was silently persisting plaintext credentials inside a project-level settings file, .claude/settings.local.json, whenever developers selected the 'Yes, and don't ask again' permission option. Across 103,617 public GitHub repositories, researchers identified 1,122 copies of the file containing at least 1,379 distinct secrets, including 379 database passwords, 43 SSH credentials, 42 VCS tokens, and 23 AWS access keys. Because Claude Code adds the file only to a user's global git excludes rather than the project's own .gitignore, the protection fails to travel with repositories, leaving committed secrets permanently accessible in git history and forks. At least one confirmed live credential was found prior to disclosure, and 63 organizations were identified among the affected file owners. This incident highlights a systemic risk posed by AI-assisted development tooling: implicit trust in convenience features can silently erode credential hygiene at scale. As agentic AI tools become standard in software pipelines, the attack surface for credential harvesting expands dramatically, demanding that security teams extend secret-scanning policies, gitignore governance, and pre-commit controls explicitly to agent configuration and memory files.
Kill Chain








