Executive Summary

In 2026, Huntress Labs researchers uncovered a new generation of phishing kits—EvilTokens, Knight Office, and Kali365—engineered specifically to steal and replay Microsoft 365 session tokens, bypassing MFA entirely. These kits operate as full Phishing-as-a-Service platforms with admin dashboards, AI-assisted lure generation, and real-time token relay infrastructure. Using Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) and device code phishing techniques, threat actors capture authenticated session tokens and immediately replay them into live M365 sessions, gaining persistent access to cloud resources, email, and downstream SaaS applications without ever needing the victim's password.

This campaign marks a decisive shift in the credential theft landscape: attackers no longer target passwords—they target identity artifacts. As MFA adoption increases, session hijacking and token replay have become the preferred bypass for enterprise cloud environments, underscoring that completed MFA no longer guarantees session integrity.

Why This Matters Now

MFA bypass via session token theft is now commoditized. Phishing kits like Kali365 and Knight Office are sold as turnkey services, enabling low-skill attackers to compromise M365 tenants at scale in 2026. With Microsoft 365 underpinning collaboration for hundreds of millions of users, the attack surface is vast and the window between token theft and account takeover is measured in seconds—not hours.

Attack Path Analysis

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques

Potential Compliance Exposure

Sector Implications

Sources

Frequently Asked Questions

Modern phishing kits use Adversary-in-the-Middle (AiTM) and device code phishing techniques to capture session tokens after MFA is successfully completed by the victim. Because the attacker replays the authenticated session token—not the credentials—MFA is effectively bypassed without the victim noticing.

Cloud Native Security Fabric Mitigations and ControlsCNSF

Based on the attack progression modeled above, these are the defensive controls that would constrain each stage.

This incident demonstrates how token-based identity attacks can bypass perimeter controls entirely, making workload-level segmentation and egress enforcement critical layers of residual defense. Aviatrix Zero Trust CNSF would likely reduce attacker reachability across cloud workloads and constrain the blast radius even after valid session tokens were captured and replayed.

Initial Compromise

Control: Cloud Native Security Fabric (CNSF)

Mitigation: Outbound access to attacker-controlled phishing infrastructure operating from cloud PaaS environments would likely be constrained, reducing the number of successful token interception opportunities originating from managed cloud workloads.

Privilege Escalation

Control: Zero Trust Segmentation

Mitigation: Zero Trust segmentation would likely constrain the scope of what an attacker operating with a replayed token could reach within the cloud environment, reducing lateral privilege scope even when identity artifacts appear fully authenticated.

Lateral Movement

Control: East-West Traffic Security

Mitigation: East-west traffic enforcement would likely constrain an attacker's ability to move freely between cloud workloads and services after gaining initial access, reducing reachability across internal segmentation boundaries even with a valid session token in hand.

Command & Control

Control: Multicloud Visibility & Control

Mitigation: Multicloud visibility and control would likely surface anomalous outbound connection patterns toward attacker-operated cloud infrastructure, reducing the ability of token refresh and command relay traffic to persist undetected across managed cloud environments.

Exfiltration

Control: Egress Security & Policy Enforcement

Mitigation: Egress security policy enforcement would likely reduce the volume of data exfiltrated by constraining outbound paths to only approved destinations, limiting how much harvested credential and session data could reach attacker-controlled endpoints through unmanaged cloud egress channels.

Impact (Mitigations)

Even if attacker persistence was established through rogue device registration and token replay, the constrained segmentation and egress posture enforced by prior CNSF controls would likely have reduced the scope of accessible cloud assets, limiting downstream BEC impact and the volume of data exposed to ongoing unauthorized access.

Impact at a Glance

Affected Business Functions

  • Microsoft 365 Cloud Email and Collaboration Services
  • Identity and Access Management (IAM) / Single Sign-On (SSO)
  • Corporate Data and Document Repositories (SharePoint, OneDrive)
  • Security Operations and Incident Response
Operational Disruption

Estimated downtime: 3 days

Financial Impact

Estimated loss: N/A

Data Exposure

Victims of session token theft targeting Microsoft 365 environments are at risk of exposure across multiple sensitive data categories: corporate email communications including confidential business correspondence, financial reports, and HR records; cloud-stored documents and files in SharePoint and OneDrive; internal credentials and authentication artifacts enabling lateral movement to downstream SaaS platforms; identity artifacts such as registered device credentials and Windows Hello keys enabling persistent re-entry; and potential exposure of customer PII, proprietary business data, and regulated information depending on the victim organization's industry. Because token replay grants access equivalent to a fully authenticated MFA-verified session, the attacker gains the same data access as the legitimate user with no further authentication barriers. The scale of exposure is amplified by the PhaaS model of kits like Kali365, which enables high-volume campaigns targeting organizations across multiple sectors simultaneously.

Recommended Actions

  • • Apply Cloud Native Security Fabric (CNSF) inline enforcement and real-time traffic inspection to detect anomalous OAuth token issuance, automated token refresh patterns, and suspicious device code authentication flows originating from unfamiliar cloud infrastructure before sessions are established.
  • • Deploy Multicloud Visibility & Control capabilities to baseline normal Microsoft 365 authentication behavior and alert on repeated malformed or automated token requests, reverse-proxy relay patterns, and authentication originating from PaaS or cloud-hosted attacker infrastructure — enabling early detection of AiTM and device code phishing activity.
  • • Enforce Egress Security & Policy Enforcement with FQDN filtering and outbound traffic controls to block data exfiltration paths used by phishing kit operator consoles, prevent unauthorized token relay to attacker-controlled PaaS endpoints, and detect outbound mailbox forwarding rule creation that enables persistent email exfiltration.
  • • Implement Zero Trust Segmentation with identity-based policy to enforce least-privilege access within Microsoft 365 tenants — restricting lateral movement across services (Exchange, SharePoint, Teams) even after a valid session token is replayed, and limiting the blast radius of any compromised identity artifact.
  • • Use Cloud Firewall (ACF) with AI-driven traffic discovery and internet egress controls to identify and block traffic to known phishing kit infrastructure, unauthorized reverse proxy endpoints, and Railway PaaS or similar platforms used as token-harvesting engines, while continuously monitoring for new unauthorized outbound destinations associated with phishing-as-a-service operations.

Secure the Paths Between Cloud Workloads

A cloud-native security fabric that enforces Zero Trust across workload communication—reducing attack paths, compliance risk, and operational complexity.

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