Executive Summary
In November 2026, researchers from ETH Zurich and Google disclosed two hardware-level attacks—Mior (CVE-2026-0462) and Skyfall (CVE-2026-40671)—targeting AMD SEV-SNP confidential computing on EPYC server processors. Mior exploits a flaw in the Platform Security Processor's initialization of the Reverse Map Table, allowing a rogue hypervisor with BIOS control to read and write encrypted VM memory and forge attestation reports. Skyfall leverages transient execution timing side-channels to extract VM register values and disk-encryption keys without hardware tampering. Both attacks require privileged host access and were demonstrated on Zen 3, Zen 4, and Zen 5 architectures. AMD has released SEV firmware and microcode patches dated August 12, 2026, with full platform firmware updates targeting November–December 2026.
These disclosures arrive as enterprises and cloud providers accelerate adoption of confidential computing to satisfy data-sovereignty mandates, HIPAA, and PCI DSS 4.0 requirements. The attacks expose a systemic gap: tenant workloads in multi-tenant cloud environments cannot independently verify host firmware integrity, making supply-chain trust and cloud-provider patch velocity critical new risk dimensions for security teams.
Why This Matters Now
Confidential computing is now a cornerstone of regulated-industry cloud strategy, with hyperscalers actively marketing AMD SEV-SNP as an isolation guarantee. Mior and Skyfall prove that a compromised or malicious cloud host can silently bypass those guarantees today. With platform firmware fixes not fully available until December 2026 and embedded EPYC patches delayed until early 2027, every organization running confidential VMs on unpatched AMD EPYC infrastructure faces an unmitigated window of exposure—precisely as regulators increase scrutiny of cloud data-protection controls.
Attack Path Analysis
A malicious cloud host operator with control over the hypervisor and BIOS firmware exploited AMD SEV-SNP hardware vulnerabilities (Mior: CVE-2026-0462, Skyfall: CVE-2026-40671) to bypass confidential computing protections and read encrypted VM memory, recover disk-encryption keys, and forge attestation reports. The attacker, acting as a rogue cloud provider or compromised infrastructure operator, leveraged uninitialized RMP entries (Mior) and transient execution side-channels (Skyfall) to escalate from hypervisor-level access to full confidential VM memory read/write, ultimately exfiltrating secrets including encryption keys and register state from tenant VMs, undermining the entire trust model of confidential computing.
Kill Chain Progression
This analysis maps confirmed threat intelligence to the full cloud kill chain to show where defensive gaps would emerge as an attack progresses.
Initial Compromise
Description
The attacker gains privileged access to the cloud host infrastructure, specifically control of the hypervisor and BIOS/UEFI firmware on AMD EPYC servers hosting SEV-SNP confidential VMs. This represents a rogue or compromised cloud provider scenario — the attack originates from within the trusted hosting boundary. No external network exploitation is required; the initial foothold is the hypervisor and firmware layer itself. AMD's own threat model for SEV-SNP explicitly distrusts UEFI, confirming this as a valid initial position.
Related CVEs
CVE-2026-0462
CVSS 5.9A vulnerability in AMD SEV-SNP firmware initialization allows a malicious host with hypervisor and BIOS control to corrupt the Reverse Map Table (RMP) via redirected PSP writes, enabling unauthorized read and write access to confidential VM memory and attestation report forgery.
Affected Products:
AMD EPYC 7003 (Milan) SEV-SNP firmware – < 1.3A.03
AMD EPYC 8004 (Genoa) SEV-SNP firmware – < 1.3A.4
AMD EPYC 8005 (Turin) SEV-SNP firmware – < 1.3A.0A
AMD EPYC 9004 (Genoa) SEV-SNP firmware – < 1.3A.4
AMD EPYC 9005 (Turin) SEV-SNP firmware – < 1.3A.0A
Exploit Status:
proof of conceptCVE-2026-40671
CVSS 4.9A transient execution side-channel vulnerability in AMD EPYC processors (Zen 3 and Zen 4) allows a malicious hypervisor to recover saved VM register values and disk-encryption keys from confidential SEV-SNP VMs by exploiting residual cached state left behind after a deliberately failed VM launch via Transient Scheduler Attack techniques.
Affected Products:
AMD EPYC 7003 (Milan) processor microcode – Zen 3, prior to August 12 2026 microcode update
AMD EPYC 9004 (Genoa) processor microcode – Zen 4, prior to August 12 2026 microcode update
AMD EPYC 9334 processor microcode – Zen 4, prior to August 12 2026 microcode update
AMD Instinct MI300A accelerator – prior to September 21 2026 patch
Exploit Status:
proof of conceptCVE-2026-18448
CVSS 5.6Missing Transient Scheduler Attack (TSA) mitigations in AMD EDK II firmware code allow a privileged attacker to read decrypted microcode updates and recover register values stored in System Management Mode (SMM) memory on AMD EPYC and Ryzen processors.
Affected Products:
AMD EDK II firmware (EPYC and Ryzen) – prior to EDK II patch (November 2026 target)
AMD EPYC 4004 series – prior to available platform firmware fix
AMD EPYC 4005 series – prior to available platform firmware fix
Exploit Status:
proof of concept
MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques
Escape to Host
Weaken Encryption
Modify Authentication Process
Unsecured Credentials
Data from Local System
Pre-OS Boot
Process Injection
Subvert Trust Controls
Potential Compliance Exposure
Mapping incident impact across multiple compliance frameworks.
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 – Process Isolation
Control ID: SC-39
CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model 2.0 – Workload Runtime Integrity and Attestation
Control ID: Workloads Pillar – Visibility and Analytics
DORA (EU Regulation 2022/2554) – ICT Asset Integrity and Third-Party Infrastructure Risk
Control ID: Article 9 – ICT Security Policies and Procedures
PCI DSS 4.0 – Firmware and Microcode Vulnerability Management
Control ID: Requirement 6.3 – Security Vulnerabilities Are Identified and Addressed
NIS2 Directive (EU 2022/2555) – Supply Chain and Hardware Security Risk
Control ID: Article 21 – Cybersecurity Risk Management Measures
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 – Secure Configuration of Hardware and Firmware
Control ID: Annex A 8.9 – Configuration Management
Sector Implications
Industry-specific impact of the vulnerabilities, including operational, regulatory, and cloud security risks.
Information Technology/IT
AMD SEV-SNP hardware vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-0462, CVE-2026-40671) allow rogue hypervisors to breach confidential VM memory, undermining zero trust segmentation and exfiltration controls across cloud-hosted IT infrastructure.
Financial Services
Confidential computing exploits via Mior and Skyfall expose encrypted VM memory and disk-encryption keys, critically threatening PCI-DSS 4.0 and NIST.800-53 compliance for financial workloads on shared cloud infrastructure.
Health Care / Life Sciences
Skyfall and Mior attacks bypass hardware-enforced VM isolation, risking patient data exfiltration from confidential cloud workloads and violating HIPAA.164.312(e)(1) and HIPAA.164.312(b) data-in-transit and audit controls.
Defense/Space
Rogue cloud host attacks reading SEV-SNP VM registers and SMM memory threaten classified workload confidentiality, undermining NIST.800-53.SC-13 secure hybrid connectivity and Zero Trust segmentation mandates for defense cloud deployments.
Sources
- New Mior and Skyfall Attacks Let Rogue Cloud Hosts Steal Secrets From AMD SEV-SNP VMshttps://thehackernews.com/2026/11/new-mior-and-skyfall-attacks-let-rogue.htmlVerified
- AMD Security Bulletin AMD-SB-3059: SEV-SNP RMP Initialization Vulnerability (Mior)https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3059.htmlVerified
- AMD Security Bulletin AMD-SB-3061: SEV-SNP VM Register Data Exposure (Skyfall)https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-3061.htmlVerified
- AMD Security Bulletin AMD-SB-7072: EDK II TSA Mitigations (Skyfall SMM Leak)https://www.amd.com/en/resources/product-security/bulletin/amd-sb-7072.htmlVerified
- Mior: Breaking SEV-SNP via RMP Initialization Attacks (CCS 2026 Paper)https://xca-attacks.github.io/mior/mior_ccs26.pdfVerified
- Skyfall: Transient Execution Attack on AMD SEV-SNP (IEEE S&P Paper)https://skyfall-attack.github.io/assets/skyfall.pdfVerified
- Supermicro Security Advisory: AMD-SB-3059 BIOS Fix Listhttps://www.supermicro.com/en/support/security_AMD-SB-3059Verified
- Mior Proof-of-Concept Code Repositoryhttps://github.com/xca-attacks/miorVerified
Frequently Asked Questions
Cloud Native Security Fabric Mitigations and ControlsCNSF
Based on the attack progression modeled above, these are the defensive controls that would constrain each stage.
Aviatrix Zero Trust CNSF is relevant here because the attacker, operating from within the hosting boundary, would still need to reach networked workloads and exfiltrate stolen secrets over cloud network paths that CNSF enforces policy on. While firmware and hypervisor compromise sits below the network fabric, CNSF segmentation and egress controls could meaningfully reduce the blast radius by constraining how far compromised workload identities can reach and how stolen data can leave the environment.
Control: Cloud Native Security Fabric (CNSF)
Mitigation: Network-layer segmentation enforced by CNSF would likely limit the reachability of infrastructure components involved in hypervisor and firmware management, reducing the number of cloud workloads and control paths accessible from a compromised host operator position.
Control: Zero Trust Segmentation
Mitigation: Zero Trust segmentation would likely reduce the network-level privilege scope available after hardware isolation is defeated, constraining how far an attacker who has compromised one VM's memory can extend access to other workloads across adjacent network segments.
Control: East-West Traffic Security
Mitigation: East-west traffic enforcement would likely constrain a forged or impersonated workload's ability to reach other segments and services, as network policy would still require permitted routing paths that an attacker-controlled identity may not satisfy beyond what attestation alone would grant.
Control: Multicloud Visibility & Control
Mitigation: Multicloud visibility and traffic telemetry could likely surface anomalous patterns associated with the host's orchestration behavior if any part of the side-channel extraction sequence generates observable network-layer artifacts, potentially reducing the attacker's ability to operate undetected across the cloud environment.
Control: Egress Security & Policy Enforcement
Mitigation: Egress policy enforcement would likely constrain the outbound network paths available to a rogue hypervisor or compromised workload attempting to transmit extracted secrets, reducing the number of permitted destinations through which stolen encryption keys and register contents could leave the cloud environment.
If prior CNSF controls had been in place, the residual impact would likely be scoped to VMs on the directly compromised physical host rather than spreading across the broader cloud environment, reducing the number of tenants and workloads exposed to stolen credentials and forged identity claims.
Impact at a Glance
Affected Business Functions
- Confidential Computing and Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) Services
- Cloud Infrastructure and Hypervisor Operations
- Cryptographic Key Management and Disk Encryption
- VM Attestation and Supply Chain Trust Verification
Estimated downtime: 45 days
Estimated loss: N/A
Confidential VM memory contents including disk-encryption keys, CPU register values containing sensitive application secrets, System Management Mode (SMM) memory data normally inaccessible to the OS kernel, decrypted microcode update contents, and forged SEV-SNP attestation measurements that could allow malicious VM images to masquerade as trusted workloads. Cloud tenants relying on AMD SEV-SNP for confidential computing isolation are exposed to host-level exfiltration of cryptographic material and workload secrets by a rogue or compromised cloud provider. The vulnerability is particularly impactful for multi-tenant cloud environments where tenant data confidentiality is contractually and regulatorily guaranteed (e.g., healthcare, financial services, government classified workloads).
Recommended Actions
Key Takeaways & Next Steps
- • Apply AMD SEV firmware (August 12 release), platform firmware, and microcode patches immediately upon availability from your server OEM or cloud provider — tenants renting confidential VMs must pressure cloud providers to confirm patch deployment and provide updated TCB attestation values per AMD-SB-3059 and AMD-SB-3061.
- • Deploy Multicloud Visibility & Control (CNSF) to monitor for anomalous hypervisor-to-VM interaction patterns, repeated failed VM start sequences, and abnormal performance-counter activity that may indicate Skyfall-style transient execution probing — centralized traffic observability across the control plane is essential for detecting host-layer exploitation attempts.
- • Enforce Egress Security & Policy Enforcement on all cloud host network paths to detect and block unauthorized outbound data flows that may carry exfiltrated VM secrets (encryption keys, register state) from compromised hypervisor nodes to attacker-controlled destinations, using FQDN filtering and anomaly-based data loss prevention.
- • Apply Zero Trust Segmentation and East-West Traffic Security controls to ensure workload-to-workload trust is not solely dependent on SEV-SNP attestation — layer identity-based policy and microsegmentation so that a forged attestation report cannot alone grant a malicious VM lateral access to services, secrets stores, or other tenant workloads.
- • Leverage Encrypted Traffic (HPE) controls such as MACsec or IPsec for all inter-node and inter-region traffic to ensure that even if hypervisor-layer secrets are extracted, data in transit between cloud nodes remains protected from interception, and deploy Inline IPS (Suricata) signatures tuned to detect known SEV-SNP exploit traffic patterns and anomalous PCIe/PSP interaction sequences where network-visible.



