Executive Summary
Beginning November 11, 2026, threat actors exploited an authentication flaw in RMM+ extensions on ConnectWise ScreenConnect instances operated by managed service providers (MSPs), enabling unauthorized command delivery to customer endpoints without valid credentials. The campaign deployed SCKit, a malicious worm toolkit, which silently installed a rogue ScreenConnect client connected to attacker-controlled infrastructure, established persistence via scheduled tasks and registry Run entries, harvested authenticated browser session cookies, and deployed RelayTrap to deliver malicious payloads to IT technicians upon their next support connection. The resulting access allowed remote administration, command execution, and lateral spread across MSP-managed environments.
This incident illustrates the accelerating trend of supply-chain and tool-abuse attacks targeting MSP platforms, where a single compromised management instance can cascade across hundreds of downstream customer environments. As remote-support tooling becomes ubiquitous in enterprise and SMB IT operations, adversaries are increasingly weaponizing legitimate administrative channels to bypass perimeter defenses and evade detection.
Why This Matters Now
MSP-targeting campaigns that weaponize legitimate remote-access platforms like ScreenConnect are surging in 2026, with threat actors exploiting extension authentication gaps to bypass normal credential controls entirely. The SCKit campaign's technician-targeting capability—using RelayTrap to pivot from customer endpoints to IT workstations—represents a dangerous evolution in lateral movement tradecraft that existing endpoint and perimeter controls are poorly positioned to detect or block without network-layer east-west visibility and egress enforcement.
Attack Path Analysis
The SCKit campaign began with exploitation of an authentication flaw in RMM+ ScreenConnect server extensions, allowing unauthenticated API access to issue commands to managed endpoints; from there, attackers installed a secondary unauthorized ScreenConnect client, deployed the SCKit worm toolkit with persistence mechanisms, harvested authenticated browser session cookies via DPAPI and memory scanning, and used hijacked technician console sessions to distribute payloads laterally across all MSP-managed devices, ultimately enabling full remote administration and further toolkit deployment across the victim estate.
Kill Chain Progression
This analysis maps confirmed threat intelligence to the full cloud kill chain to show where defensive gaps would emerge as an attack progresses.
Initial Compromise
Description
Threat actors exploited CVE-2026-84869, an authentication bypass flaw in RMM+ ScreenConnect server extensions (versions 1.0.31–1.0.32) where an unconfigured access key allowed an empty key to be accepted. This permitted unauthenticated API calls to the ScreenConnect management server, enabling remote command delivery to enrolled customer endpoints without valid technician credentials.
Related CVEs
CVE-2026-84869
CVSS 9.9A client-side vulnerability in ConnectWise ScreenConnect host clients prior to version 26.6.5 allows a malicious guest endpoint to deliver arbitrary payloads to a connecting technician workstation through the ScreenConnect session relay mechanism, enabling remote code execution on the technician device.
Affected Products:
ConnectWise ScreenConnect – < 26.6.5
Exploit Status:
exploited in the wild
MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques
External Remote Services
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
Ingress Tool Transfer
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
Steal Web Session Cookie
Valid Accounts
Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
Lateral Tool Transfer
Data Encrypted for Impact
Obfuscated Files or Information
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
Obtain Capabilities: Tool
Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
Potential Compliance Exposure
Mapping incident impact across multiple compliance frameworks.
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 – Remote Access
Control ID: AC-17
NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 – Malicious Code Protection
Control ID: SI-3
PCI DSS 4.0 – Management of System and Application Accounts Used by Systems
Control ID: Requirement 8.6
PCI DSS 4.0 – Cryptographic Cipher Suites and Protocols Are Documented and Reviewed
Control ID: Requirement 12.3.3
NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500 – Monitoring of Authorized Users and Detection of Anomalous Activity
Control ID: Section 500.14
DORA (EU 2022/2554) – ICT-Related Incident Detection
Control ID: Article 10
NIS2 Directive (EU 2022/2555) – Supply Chain Security
Control ID: Article 21(2)(e)
CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model 2.0 – Network Segmentation and Least-Privilege Access Enforcement
Control ID: Network Pillar – Macro/Micro Segmentation
ISO/IEC 27001:2022 – Configuration Management
Control ID: Annex A 8.9
Sector Implications
Industry-specific impact of the vulnerabilities, including operational, regulatory, and cloud security risks.
Information Technology/IT
MSP-managed IT environments face direct RAT worm propagation via hijacked ScreenConnect sessions, enabling lateral movement and credential theft across managed endpoints with NIST.800-53.SC-7 compliance gaps.
Computer/Network Security
Security operations teams face compromised technician workstations through RelayTrap, undermining incident response integrity and exposing authenticated ScreenConnect console sessions via DPAPI browser-cookie theft.
Financial Services
Financial sector MSP-managed endpoints risk unauthorized remote access and exfiltration of sensitive data, triggering PCI.4.0.4.2.1 and NIST.CSF.PR.DS-5 violations through SCKit's egress and credential-harvesting capabilities.
Health Care / Life Sciences
Healthcare MSP customers face HIPAA.164.312(e)(1) and HIPAA.164.308(a)(6) exposure as SCKit establishes persistent unauthorized access channels, enabling unencrypted data exfiltration and compromised technician-administered clinical endpoints.
Sources
- SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessionshttps://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/Verified
- ConnectWise Security Investigation and Partner Guidance - RMM+ Extension Authentication Flaw Advisoryhttps://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletinsVerified
- CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Cataloghttps://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalogVerified
- ConnectWise ScreenConnect Security Bulletin - CVE-2026-84869 Fix and Client 26.6.5 Guidancehttps://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/security-bulletins/connectwise-screenconnectVerified
- NVD - National Vulnerability Databasehttps://nvd.nist.gov/Verified
- ConnectWise ScreenConnect Extensions Documentationhttps://docs.connectwise.com/ConnectWise_Control_Documentation/Get_started/Administration_guide/ExtensionsVerified
Frequently Asked Questions
Cloud Native Security Fabric Mitigations and ControlsCNSF
Based on the attack progression modeled above, these are the defensive controls that would constrain each stage.
The SCKit campaign exploited a trusted RMM platform to move laterally across an entire MSP customer estate, making microsegmentation and controlled egress directly relevant to limiting attacker reach. Aviatrix Zero Trust CNSF would likely reduce the blast radius by constraining how far compromised endpoints and hijacked sessions could communicate across tenant and workload boundaries.
Control: Cloud Native Security Fabric (CNSF)
Mitigation: Placing the ScreenConnect management server within a CNSF-enforced segment could limit which sources are permitted to reach its API surface, meaning unauthenticated or unexpected external callers would likely be dropped before the exploit chain progresses further.
Control: Zero Trust Segmentation
Mitigation: Zero Trust segmentation enforced at the workload level could constrain the operational scope available to the compromised endpoint service context, reducing its ability to reach staging locations or execute installer workflows that fall outside defined workload behavior.
Control: East-West Traffic Security
Mitigation: East-west enforcement between MSP-managed endpoint segments and technician workstation segments would likely reduce the reachability that RelayTrap and ToolboxRelayUploader relied on, constraining how freely hijacked sessions could be used to push payloads across tenant and workload boundaries.
Control: Multicloud Visibility & Control
Mitigation: Centralized multicloud visibility across workload egress paths would likely surface the unexpected outbound connections to external relay infrastructure, and policy enforcement could reduce the reachability of endpoints to attacker-controlled domains outside of approved destination sets.
Control: Egress Security & Policy Enforcement
Mitigation: Egress policy enforcement scoped to endpoint workloads would likely constrain outbound paths available for transmitting harvested credential material, reducing the attacker's ability to move extracted cookies and tokens to external collection infrastructure.
Had prior CNSF controls been applied across segmentation, east-west paths, and egress, the attacker's ability to reach all MSP-managed tenants from a single compromised session would likely have been reduced, constraining the scope of persistent access that the toolkit could establish and maintain.
Impact at a Glance
Affected Business Functions
- Managed Service Provider (MSP) Remote Support Operations
- IT Technician Workstation Integrity and Session Management
- Customer Endpoint Administration and Remote Monitoring
- Privileged Identity and Authentication Session Security
Estimated downtime: 14 days
Estimated loss: N/A
Authenticated ScreenConnect web session cookies (.ASPXAUTH tokens) for MSP management consoles were targeted, enabling lateral access to all customer endpoints managed by the hijacked technician account. Browser-stored credentials and session tokens across Chrome, Edge, Opera, and Opera GX were at risk of extraction via DPAPI decryption and memory scanning. Customer endpoint configurations, managed device inventories, and remote command execution access across downstream MSP-managed environments were exposed. The worm's propagation design enabled distribution of additional malicious payloads to all endpoints accessible from the compromised MSP console, representing a supply-chain-style exposure affecting potentially hundreds of downstream organizations.
Recommended Actions
Key Takeaways & Next Steps
- • Apply Zero Trust Segmentation (microsegmentation and identity-based policy enforcement) to restrict ScreenConnect server extension APIs so that unauthenticated or anomalous API callers — including those presenting empty access keys — are blocked at the network layer before commands reach managed endpoints, directly addressing the RMM+ authentication bypass entry point.
- • Deploy East-West Traffic Security controls to monitor and enforce policy on workload-to-workload and technician-to-endpoint communication flows within the MSP environment; lateral movement via RelayTrap and Shared Toolbox distribution would be detectable and blockable as anomalous internal session-to-session traffic deviating from approved service identity baselines.
- • Enforce Egress Security and Policy Enforcement with FQDN-based filtering to block unauthorized outbound connections to attacker-controlled ScreenConnect relay domains and IP addresses (ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev, sc[.]payproofkit[.]com, cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com); preventing toolkit component retrieval via curl.exe and PowerShell would disrupt the C2 delivery chain and inhibit re-deployment after partial cleanup.
- • Activate Multicloud Visibility and Control with centralized traffic observability to baseline normal ScreenConnect management traffic patterns and generate alerts on anomalous behaviors such as repeated MSI downloads from novel external hosts, unexpected Run Command API calls, Shared Toolbox bulk distribution events, and sudden spikes in cross-session payload uploads that characterize SCKit's worm propagation design.
- • Enable Inline IPS (Suricata) on egress paths from MSP management infrastructure to detect and block known malicious payload signatures, exploit traffic patterns associated with ScreenConnect extension abuse, and covert data exfiltration channels; combined with Cloud Firewall URL filtering, this layered enforcement would reduce the attack surface for both the initial server-side compromise and the browser cookie exfiltration stages.



