Executive Summary

Beginning November 11, 2026, threat actors exploited an authentication flaw in RMM+ extensions on ConnectWise ScreenConnect instances operated by managed service providers (MSPs), enabling unauthorized command delivery to customer endpoints without valid credentials. The campaign deployed SCKit, a malicious worm toolkit, which silently installed a rogue ScreenConnect client connected to attacker-controlled infrastructure, established persistence via scheduled tasks and registry Run entries, harvested authenticated browser session cookies, and deployed RelayTrap to deliver malicious payloads to IT technicians upon their next support connection. The resulting access allowed remote administration, command execution, and lateral spread across MSP-managed environments.

This incident illustrates the accelerating trend of supply-chain and tool-abuse attacks targeting MSP platforms, where a single compromised management instance can cascade across hundreds of downstream customer environments. As remote-support tooling becomes ubiquitous in enterprise and SMB IT operations, adversaries are increasingly weaponizing legitimate administrative channels to bypass perimeter defenses and evade detection.

Why This Matters Now

MSP-targeting campaigns that weaponize legitimate remote-access platforms like ScreenConnect are surging in 2026, with threat actors exploiting extension authentication gaps to bypass normal credential controls entirely. The SCKit campaign's technician-targeting capability—using RelayTrap to pivot from customer endpoints to IT workstations—represents a dangerous evolution in lateral movement tradecraft that existing endpoint and perimeter controls are poorly positioned to detect or block without network-layer east-west visibility and egress enforcement.

Attack Path Analysis

Related CVEs

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques

Potential Compliance Exposure

Sector Implications

Sources

Frequently Asked Questions

SCKit exploited an authentication flaw in RMM+ ScreenConnect server extensions (versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32) where an unconfigured access key allowed unauthenticated API calls, enabling attackers to issue remote commands to managed endpoints without valid MSP credentials.

Cloud Native Security Fabric Mitigations and ControlsCNSF

Based on the attack progression modeled above, these are the defensive controls that would constrain each stage.

The SCKit campaign exploited a trusted RMM platform to move laterally across an entire MSP customer estate, making microsegmentation and controlled egress directly relevant to limiting attacker reach. Aviatrix Zero Trust CNSF would likely reduce the blast radius by constraining how far compromised endpoints and hijacked sessions could communicate across tenant and workload boundaries.

Initial Compromise

Control: Cloud Native Security Fabric (CNSF)

Mitigation: Placing the ScreenConnect management server within a CNSF-enforced segment could limit which sources are permitted to reach its API surface, meaning unauthenticated or unexpected external callers would likely be dropped before the exploit chain progresses further.

Privilege Escalation

Control: Zero Trust Segmentation

Mitigation: Zero Trust segmentation enforced at the workload level could constrain the operational scope available to the compromised endpoint service context, reducing its ability to reach staging locations or execute installer workflows that fall outside defined workload behavior.

Lateral Movement

Control: East-West Traffic Security

Mitigation: East-west enforcement between MSP-managed endpoint segments and technician workstation segments would likely reduce the reachability that RelayTrap and ToolboxRelayUploader relied on, constraining how freely hijacked sessions could be used to push payloads across tenant and workload boundaries.

Command & Control

Control: Multicloud Visibility & Control

Mitigation: Centralized multicloud visibility across workload egress paths would likely surface the unexpected outbound connections to external relay infrastructure, and policy enforcement could reduce the reachability of endpoints to attacker-controlled domains outside of approved destination sets.

Exfiltration

Control: Egress Security & Policy Enforcement

Mitigation: Egress policy enforcement scoped to endpoint workloads would likely constrain outbound paths available for transmitting harvested credential material, reducing the attacker's ability to move extracted cookies and tokens to external collection infrastructure.

Impact (Mitigations)

Had prior CNSF controls been applied across segmentation, east-west paths, and egress, the attacker's ability to reach all MSP-managed tenants from a single compromised session would likely have been reduced, constraining the scope of persistent access that the toolkit could establish and maintain.

Impact at a Glance

Affected Business Functions

  • Managed Service Provider (MSP) Remote Support Operations
  • IT Technician Workstation Integrity and Session Management
  • Customer Endpoint Administration and Remote Monitoring
  • Privileged Identity and Authentication Session Security
Operational Disruption

Estimated downtime: 14 days

Financial Impact

Estimated loss: N/A

Data Exposure

Authenticated ScreenConnect web session cookies (.ASPXAUTH tokens) for MSP management consoles were targeted, enabling lateral access to all customer endpoints managed by the hijacked technician account. Browser-stored credentials and session tokens across Chrome, Edge, Opera, and Opera GX were at risk of extraction via DPAPI decryption and memory scanning. Customer endpoint configurations, managed device inventories, and remote command execution access across downstream MSP-managed environments were exposed. The worm's propagation design enabled distribution of additional malicious payloads to all endpoints accessible from the compromised MSP console, representing a supply-chain-style exposure affecting potentially hundreds of downstream organizations.

Recommended Actions

  • • Apply Zero Trust Segmentation (microsegmentation and identity-based policy enforcement) to restrict ScreenConnect server extension APIs so that unauthenticated or anomalous API callers — including those presenting empty access keys — are blocked at the network layer before commands reach managed endpoints, directly addressing the RMM+ authentication bypass entry point.
  • • Deploy East-West Traffic Security controls to monitor and enforce policy on workload-to-workload and technician-to-endpoint communication flows within the MSP environment; lateral movement via RelayTrap and Shared Toolbox distribution would be detectable and blockable as anomalous internal session-to-session traffic deviating from approved service identity baselines.
  • • Enforce Egress Security and Policy Enforcement with FQDN-based filtering to block unauthorized outbound connections to attacker-controlled ScreenConnect relay domains and IP addresses (ns[.]mo7sen[.]dev, sc[.]payproofkit[.]com, cdn007-digitaldownloads[.]com); preventing toolkit component retrieval via curl.exe and PowerShell would disrupt the C2 delivery chain and inhibit re-deployment after partial cleanup.
  • • Activate Multicloud Visibility and Control with centralized traffic observability to baseline normal ScreenConnect management traffic patterns and generate alerts on anomalous behaviors such as repeated MSI downloads from novel external hosts, unexpected Run Command API calls, Shared Toolbox bulk distribution events, and sudden spikes in cross-session payload uploads that characterize SCKit's worm propagation design.
  • • Enable Inline IPS (Suricata) on egress paths from MSP management infrastructure to detect and block known malicious payload signatures, exploit traffic patterns associated with ScreenConnect extension abuse, and covert data exfiltration channels; combined with Cloud Firewall URL filtering, this layered enforcement would reduce the attack surface for both the initial server-side compromise and the browser cookie exfiltration stages.

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