Executive Summary
In January 2026, multiple sensors and the SANS Internet Storm Center reported a wave of targeted web application scans probing for exposed environment and configuration files on webservers using the /$(pwd)/ path pattern. Attackers, active since at least January 13th, systematically searched for sensitive files such as .env, docker-compose.yml, and terraform.tfstate, potentially exposing credentials and secrets. Two identified IP addresses (185.177.72.52, 185.177.72.23) led these scans, illustrating an automated approach likely leveraging misconfigured servers. While no confirmed breaches have been disclosed, such activity significantly raises the risk of follow-on exploitation or credential theft if vulnerable files are found.
This incident highlights growing attacker sophistication in discovering misconfigurations and automating reconnaissance. The use of predictable directory traversal patterns and attempts to surface hidden files underscore the need for robust web application hardening and monitoring, especially as threat actors increasingly leverage similar tactics to bypass traditional defenses.
Why This Matters Now
With a rise in automated reconnaissance targeting configuration exposures, organizations face urgent risk of credential leaks, privilege escalation, and further attack chain progression. Advanced scanning patterns like /$(pwd)/ can easily evade legacy controls, making vigilant file permission management and application-layer monitoring a top priority to prevent incident escalation.
Attack Path Analysis
The attack began with adversaries conducting automated web scans targeting environment and configuration files using unusual path injection patterns such as /$(pwd)/. By probing for sensitive files, attackers hoped to identify misconfigurations or exposed secrets for potential access. If successful, access to such files could enable privilege escalation through credential or key harvesting. With valid credentials or configuration details, attackers could then attempt to move laterally across internal cloud services. Should lateral movement grant broader access, infrastructure could be used to establish command and control through outbound connections or payloads. Data exfiltration would become possible if sensitive files or secrets were extracted. Ultimately, the impact could involve business disruption, data exposure, or enabling further attacks.
Kill Chain Progression
Initial Compromise
Description
Adversaries scanned public-facing web servers using path manipulation patterns (e.g., /$(pwd)/) to discover misconfigurations or exposed sensitive files like .env and configuration files.
Related CVEs
CVE-2026-22977
CVSS 7.5An XML External Entity (XXE) vulnerability in the web server allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via crafted XML input.
Affected Products:
ExampleVendor ExampleWebServer – 1.0, 1.1, 1.2
Exploit Status:
active scanning observedCVE-2026-22976
CVSS 7A directory traversal vulnerability in the web server allows remote attackers to access sensitive files via crafted URL paths.
Affected Products:
ExampleVendor ExampleWebServer – 1.0, 1.1, 1.2
Exploit Status:
active scanning observed
MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques
Mapped MITRE ATT&CK techniques reflect the web application scanning and probing for environment files relevant to credential access and reconnaissance. Further enrichment may expand with full TTP or STIX/TAXII detail.
Active Scanning
Exploit Public-Facing Application
File and Directory Discovery
Exploitation of Remote Services
Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
Brute Force
Supply Chain Compromise
Potential Compliance Exposure
Mapping incident impact across multiple compliance frameworks.
PCI DSS v4.0 – Protect Stored Account Data
Control ID: 8.3.1
NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500 – Cybersecurity Policy
Control ID: 500.03
DORA (Digital Operational Resilience Act) – ICT Risk Management Framework
Control ID: Art. 9(2)
NIS2 Directive – Technical and Organizational Cybersecurity Measures
Control ID: Art. 21
CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model 2.0 – Proactive Monitoring of Access Attempts
Control ID: Identity Pillar – Detect and Respond
Sector Implications
Industry-specific impact of the vulnerabilities, including operational, regulatory, and cloud security risks.
Computer Software/Engineering
Web application attacks targeting configuration files expose source code, API keys, and infrastructure secrets in development environments and production systems.
Information Technology/IT
Path traversal scanning for sensitive files like docker-compose.yml and terraform.tfstate compromises infrastructure-as-code deployments and container orchestration security.
Financial Services
Environment file scanning threatens PCI compliance by exposing payment processing credentials and database connections through unencrypted traffic monitoring.
Health Care / Life Sciences
Configuration file exposure violates HIPAA requirements, compromising patient data through leaked database credentials and API keys in healthcare applications.
Sources
- Scanning Webserver with /$(pwd)/ as a Starting Path, (Sun, Jan 25th)https://isc.sans.edu/diary/rss/32654Verified
- NVD - CVE-2026-22977https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22977Verified
- NVD - CVE-2026-22976https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22976Verified
Frequently Asked Questions
Cloud Native Security Fabric Mitigations and ControlsCNSF
Zero Trust and CNSF controls such as microsegmentation, East-West traffic security, egress enforcement, and inline IPS could have detected, limited, or prevented exploitation attempts stemming from unauthorized web probes and exposure of sensitive files. Applying least-privilege segmentation and outbound policy would have constrained attacker movement and prevented data leakage.
Control: Inline IPS (Suricata)
Mitigation: Detection and blocking of exploit scanning patterns at ingress.
Control: Zero Trust Segmentation
Mitigation: Limit privilege escalation scope through least privilege and microsegmentation.
Control: East-West Traffic Security
Mitigation: Detect and restrict unauthorized East-West movements.
Control: Multicloud Visibility & Control
Mitigation: Detection and alerting on anomalous outbound and automated web traffic.
Control: Egress Security & Policy Enforcement
Mitigation: Outbound data exfiltration blocked or alerted on via egress policy.
Reduce risk and speed up detection of malicious activity through distributed cloud-native enforcement.
Impact at a Glance
Affected Business Functions
- Web Services
- Data Management
Estimated downtime: 3 days
Estimated loss: $50,000
Potential exposure of sensitive configuration files, including environment variables and API keys, leading to unauthorized access and data breaches.
Recommended Actions
Key Takeaways & Next Steps
- • Deploy inline IPS at cloud ingress points to detect and block malicious scanning and exploit patterns targeting sensitive file paths.
- • Enforce Zero Trust segmentation to ensure workload and credential access is restricted to only what is necessary, minimizing escalation risk.
- • Implement East-West traffic controls and microsegmentation to restrict attacker movement between cloud workloads and environments.
- • Apply strict egress policy enforcement to prevent unauthorized data exfiltration and receive alerts on anomalous outbound activity.
- • Use centralized, multicloud visibility and anomaly detection tools to quickly identify suspicious web probing and automated traffic for rapid response.

