Executive Summary
In June 2026, Rockwell Automation disclosed two critical vulnerabilities affecting its CompactLogix 5370 series controllers, specifically models L1, L2, and L3. The first vulnerability, CVE-2025-11694, involves improper validation of sequence numbers and source IP addresses in the CIP protocol, allowing attackers to exploit exposed Connection IDs to induce denial-of-service conditions. The second, CVE-2026-9307, pertains to the exposure of sensitive system information through the controller's web server, which reveals CIP Connection IDs to unauthenticated users, potentially leading to similar denial-of-service attacks. Both vulnerabilities have been addressed in firmware version V38.011, and users are strongly advised to update their systems accordingly. (rockwellautomation.com)
These vulnerabilities underscore the persistent risks in industrial control systems, particularly in critical manufacturing sectors. The disclosure highlights the necessity for continuous monitoring, timely patch management, and adherence to cybersecurity best practices to safeguard operational technology environments from potential disruptions.
Why This Matters Now
The recent disclosure of these vulnerabilities in Rockwell Automation's CompactLogix controllers highlights the ongoing threats to industrial control systems. Immediate attention is required to update affected systems to firmware version V38.011 to prevent potential exploitation leading to operational disruptions.
Attack Path Analysis
An attacker exploited vulnerabilities in Rockwell Automation CompactLogix 5370 controllers to cause a denial-of-service condition. The attack began with the discovery of exposed CIP Connection IDs via the controller's web server, leading to the construction of malicious packets that triggered a major nonrecoverable fault, requiring a restart to recover.
Kill Chain Progression
Initial Compromise
Description
The attacker accessed the controller's web server to obtain exposed CIP Connection IDs without authentication.
Related CVEs
CVE-2025-11694
CVSS 8.7Improper validation of sequence numbers and source IP addresses in the CIP protocol allows attackers to perform denial-of-service attacks, resulting in a minor fault.
Affected Products:
Rockwell Automation CompactLogix 5370 L1 – < V38.011
Rockwell Automation CompactLogix 5370 L2 – < V38.011
Rockwell Automation CompactLogix 5370 L3 – < V38.011
Exploit Status:
no public exploitCVE-2026-9307
CVSS 6.3Exposure of CIP Connection IDs on the diagnostics webpage allows unauthenticated users to construct malicious packets, leading to denial-of-service.
Affected Products:
Rockwell Automation CompactLogix 5370 L1 – < V38.011
Rockwell Automation CompactLogix 5370 L2 – < V38.011
Rockwell Automation CompactLogix 5370 L3 – < V38.011
Exploit Status:
no public exploit
MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques
Network Denial of Service
Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
File and Directory Discovery
Network Sniffing
Exploitation for Client Execution
Potential Compliance Exposure
Mapping incident impact across multiple compliance frameworks.
NIST SP 800-53 – Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management
Control ID: SC-12
PCI DSS 4.0 – Security Vulnerabilities Identification
Control ID: 6.4.1
NYDFS 23 NYCRR 500 – Cybersecurity Policy
Control ID: 500.03
DORA – ICT Risk Management Framework
Control ID: Article 5
CISA ZTMM 2.0 – Identity
Control ID: Pillar 1
NIS2 Directive – Cybersecurity Risk Management Measures
Control ID: Article 21
Sector Implications
Industry-specific impact of the vulnerabilities, including operational, regulatory, and cloud security risks.
Industrial Automation
Critical exposure as CompactLogix controllers are core industrial automation components; DoS vulnerabilities threaten production continuity and operational technology systems.
Automotive
Manufacturing lines using Rockwell CompactLogix PLCs face production disruption risks from network-accessible denial-of-service attacks exposing CIP connection vulnerabilities.
Food Production
Processing facilities dependent on CompactLogix controllers vulnerable to network-based DoS attacks that could halt critical food safety and production processes.
Oil/Energy/Solar/Greentech
Energy infrastructure using affected PLCs exposed to remote denial-of-service attacks through unvalidated CIP protocols, risking operational disruption and safety systems.
Sources
- Rockwell Automation CompactLogixhttps://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-167-04Verified
- Rockwell Automation Security Advisory SD1776https://www.rockwellautomation.com/en-us/trust-center/security-advisories/advisory.SD1776.htmlVerified
Frequently Asked Questions
Cloud Native Security Fabric Mitigations and ControlsCNSF
Aviatrix Zero Trust CNSF is pertinent to this incident as it could likely limit the attacker's ability to exploit vulnerabilities in the Rockwell Automation CompactLogix 5370 controllers, thereby reducing the potential blast radius of such attacks.
Control: Cloud Native Security Fabric (CNSF)
Mitigation: Implementing Aviatrix CNSF would likely limit unauthorized access to the controller's web server, reducing the attacker's ability to exploit exposed CIP Connection IDs.
Control: Zero Trust Segmentation
Mitigation: Aviatrix Zero Trust Segmentation would likely limit the attacker's ability to escalate privileges by restricting unauthorized interactions with the controller.
Control: East-West Traffic Security
Mitigation: Aviatrix East-West Traffic Security would likely limit the attacker's ability to move laterally by restricting unauthorized communications between controllers.
Control: Multicloud Visibility & Control
Mitigation: Aviatrix Multicloud Visibility & Control would likely limit the attacker's ability to maintain command and control over compromised controllers by restricting unauthorized outbound communications.
Control: Egress Security & Policy Enforcement
Mitigation: Aviatrix Egress Security & Policy Enforcement would likely limit the attacker's ability to exfiltrate data by restricting unauthorized outbound traffic.
Aviatrix Zero Trust CNSF would likely limit the overall impact of the attack by reducing the attacker's ability to exploit vulnerabilities and propagate within the network.
Impact at a Glance
Affected Business Functions
- Industrial Process Control
- Manufacturing Operations
- Supply Chain Management
Estimated downtime: 3 days
Estimated loss: $500,000
No sensitive data exposure reported.
Recommended Actions
Key Takeaways & Next Steps
- • Implement Zero Trust Segmentation to restrict unauthorized access to critical systems.
- • Deploy Inline IPS (Suricata) to detect and prevent malicious packet transmissions.
- • Utilize Threat Detection & Anomaly Response systems to identify and respond to unusual activities.
- • Apply Secure Hybrid Connectivity (DCE) to ensure secure communication channels.
- • Regularly update and patch systems to mitigate known vulnerabilities.



