STRUCTURED THREAT INTELLIGENCE FOR THE CLOUD COMMUNITY

Aviatrix Threat Research Center

Cloud breaches are accelerating — across identities, workloads, supply chains, and cloud-native services. In the Containment Era, understanding how a breach unfolds is how you architect to stop it.

The Aviatrix Threat Research Center provides security teams with:

A structured understanding of how breaches unfold — kill chain, ATT&CK techniques, CVEs, and IOCs in a consistent format.
What attackers exploited, and which enforcement gaps let them move.
Where workload-level controls would have broken the attack chain — including paths that posture tools and endpoint detection don't model.

Kill Chain Coverage

ATT&CK Mapped

Real-World IOCs

Threat ReportsLive Intelligence

Recent Breaches, Security Incidents & Vulnerabilities

A unified view of real-world cloud threats — combining AI-powered analysis, security research, and expert perspectives through a consistent, cloud-specific framework.

AI-Powered Threat Analysis

Agentic AI that analyzes real-world attacks — across security incidents, breaches, and exploited vulnerabilities — to produce structured, actionable intelligence.

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Displaying 1 to 12 of 6831 threat reports

Financial Services4 hours ago

How Agentic AI Breached Chainalysis: Inside the 2026 Intrusion Into Internal Tools and Customer Identity Data

In October 2026, blockchain analytics firm Chainalysis disclosed a cybersecurity breach in which an external threat actor leveraged offensive agentic AI techniques to gain unauthorized access to internal tools and non-sensitive customer data. Exposed records included user IDs, full names, email addresses, and organizational role labels for platform users. Critically, investigation content, authentication credentials, and session tokens were not accessed. The attack was attributed to an AI-powered automated intrusion chain, consistent with the emerging Vapor Panda campaign using the ARTEX agentic penetration testing framework, which compromised approximately 140 organizations across 11 days in a broad access operation. This incident underscores a pivotal shift in the threat landscape: adversarial AI is now being weaponized to automate and scale intrusion campaigns far beyond human operator pace. AI-driven agentic attack chains reduce the cost and complexity of targeting high-value intelligence firms, signaling a new threat tier for financial-intelligence and compliance-adjacent organizations.

Medium impact

Kill Chain

ICInitial Compromise(medium)

PEPrivilege Escalation(medium)

LMLateral Movement(medium)

C&CCommand & Control(low)

EExfiltration(high)

IImpact(high)

Read report

Computer Software/Engineering4 hours ago

How a Fake Claude Code Extension Turned Developer Workstations Into SSH Backdoor Relays

On October 29, 2026, a tampered version of the Anthropic Claude Code extension (versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313) was served via the Cursor IDE extension marketplace for approximately eleven hours. The injected JavaScript loader executed silently at module load time, collected host reconnaissance data, appended an attacker-controlled SSH public key, enabled the local SSH service, established a reverse SSH tunnel to a remote command-and-control server at 134.209.82.225, and installed platform-specific persistence mechanisms on macOS, Linux, and Windows. Microsoft Threat Intelligence confirmed that neither the Visual Studio Marketplace, npm, nor Anthropic's own systems were compromised; the attack was isolated to the Cursor marketplace supply chain. This incident illustrates how AI-branded developer tooling has become a high-value supply-chain target. As agentic AI coding assistants proliferate across enterprise developer workstations, adversaries are increasingly weaponizing trusted extension ecosystems to implant persistent backdoors, underscoring the urgency of extension vetting, egress controls, and zero-trust segmentation in developer environments.

High impact

Kill Chain

ICInitial Compromise(high)

PEPrivilege Escalation(high)

LMLateral Movement(medium)

C&CCommand & Control(high)

EExfiltration(high)

IImpact(medium)

Read report

Government Administration5 hours ago

Vapor Panda Used Agentic AI to Compromise 140 Targets in 11 Days—Here Is What That Means for Your Cloud Security

Beginning October 17, a China state-sponsored threat actor tracked by CrowdStrike as Vapor Panda deployed ARTEX—an agentic AI-powered penetration-testing framework paired with DeepSeek—to compromise approximately 140 of more than 200 targeted organizations across 14 countries in just 11 days. Targets spanned foreign ministries, defense and intelligence agencies, a European head-of-government office, and 19 U.S. organizations in pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, defense, nuclear, and financial sectors, as well as telecom providers in the United States, Belgium, and the Philippines. ARTEX enabled attack commands at rates exceeding 1,500 per hour—roughly 37 times the pace of traditional hands-on-keyboard intrusions—allowing simultaneous multi-target exploitation at near-zero marginal cost per victim. This campaign marks the first confirmed nation-state deployment of agentic AI at scale for offensive cyber operations. CrowdStrike reports agentic adversary attacks grew nearly threefold month-over-month, from roughly 45 incidents in September to 126 in October 2024 and climbing, signaling a structural shift in the speed, breadth, and economics of state-sponsored intrusion campaigns that defenders must urgently address.

Critical impact

Kill Chain

ICInitial Compromise(high)

PEPrivilege Escalation(medium)

LMLateral Movement(medium)

C&CCommand & Control(medium)

EExfiltration(medium)

IImpact(high)

Read report

Semiconductors21 hours ago

AI-Powered ARTEX: How Vapor Panda Turned Agentic LLMs Into a Weapon Against 200+ Global Organizations

Beginning October 17, 2026, the Chinese state-sponsored threat actor Vapor Panda (also tracked as Earth Estries) weaponized ARTEX, a Go-based agentic AI penetration-testing framework, to compromise or probe more than 200 organizations across foreign ministries, semiconductor firms, defense contractors, telecommunications providers, and financial institutions worldwide. Leveraging DeepSeek and a commercial LLM, ARTEX autonomously coordinated planner and worker agents to execute reconnaissance, credential spraying, SAML/XXE chaining, container escapes, and lateral movement—consuming roughly 1.4 billion input tokens in a single intrusion. Post-exploitation was confirmed at nine organizations, where the group deployed BLOODALCHEMY, a ShadowPad derivative, enabling persistent covert access at scale previously unachievable through manual operations. This campaign marks a qualitative shift in state-sponsored cyber espionage: agentic AI now allows a small operator team to run concurrent, multi-path intrusions across dozens of targets simultaneously. As ARTEX proliferates among multiple threat clusters, defenders must urgently reassess detection strategies, east-west segmentation, and egress controls designed for human-paced adversaries, not autonomous AI agents operating at machine speed.

High impact

Kill Chain

ICInitial Compromise(high)

PEPrivilege Escalation(high)

LMLateral Movement(high)

C&CCommand & Control(high)

EExfiltration(high)

IImpact(medium)

Read report

Defense/Space1 day ago

KeyDrift Malware: How APT Group UAT-11473 Hijacked Cisco SD-WAN to Steal Encryption Keys

In late 2026, Cisco Talos researchers identified a newly tracked APT cluster, UAT-11473, actively exploiting CVE-2026-20127—a maximum-severity authentication-bypass vulnerability in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controllers—to deploy a custom malware framework called KeyDrift. The attackers, assessed to overlap with Volt Typhoon's Silent Train covert access network, targeted space and satellite services, defense and aerospace technology, and policy research organizations. KeyDrift's two components, PolyFlame and LittleFilch, enabled persistent access, control-plane traffic interception, AES-256 IPsec key material extraction, and encrypted exfiltration of stolen cryptographic keying data via UDP to attacker-controlled infrastructure. This incident underscores a rising trend of nation-state APT actors targeting network control-plane infrastructure rather than endpoints, using custom implants specifically engineered to evade detection and harvest cryptographic keying material. As SD-WAN adoption accelerates across critical sectors, attacks that compromise the encryption fabric itself represent a qualitative escalation in persistent threat sophistication.

Critical impact

Kill Chain

ICInitial Compromise(high)

PEPrivilege Escalation(high)

LMLateral Movement(medium)

C&CCommand & Control(high)

EExfiltration(high)

IImpact(medium)

Read report

Information Technology/IT1 day ago

Hugging Face GPU Hijack: How a Malicious AI Model Campaign Stole Cloud Compute at Scale

In late October 2026, researchers at Pluto Security uncovered a recurring supply-chain campaign on Hugging Face in which a financially motivated, Chinese-speaking threat actor published 31 malicious AI model repositories across seven accounts in two coordinated waves since September 2026. The models, disguised as Qwen2 test checkpoints, exploited Hugging Face's trust_remote_code feature to execute malicious Python code at model-load time on GPU inference servers. The most downloaded model, MENXIANGYU/qwen2-tiny, accumulated 28,412 downloads, silently installed a cryptocurrency miner, established persistence, and opened reverse shells granting direct server access. The attacker's wallet collected roughly $5,000 in Pearl (PRL) cryptocurrency, and a second wave of repositories reappeared within days of the initial takedown—one introducing a container-escape script. Traditional AV and partner scanning tools returned clean results throughout the campaign. This incident signals a maturing threat pattern in which adversaries weaponize trusted AI model repositories as a software supply-chain vector, bypassing conventional security controls by abusing legitimate platform features rather than known malware signatures. As enterprises accelerate AI workload adoption on GPU-intensive cloud infrastructure, the attack surface for model-based supply-chain compromise is expanding rapidly, demanding new runtime enforcement and egress control strategies.

High impact

Kill Chain

ICInitial Compromise(high)

PEPrivilege Escalation(high)

LMLateral Movement(medium)

C&CCommand & Control(high)

EExfiltration(high)

IImpact(high)

Read report

Banking/Mortgage1 day ago

ThreatsDay October 2026: AI-Powered Ransomware, FortiBleed 2.0, Token Theft, and the New Economics of Cyberattack

In the week of October 29, 2026, a sweeping composite of cyber threats emerged spanning ransomware, infostealers, supply-chain compromise, cloud misconfiguration, AI/GenAI abuse, and credential theft. Key incidents included the FortiBleed 2.0 campaign exposing 40,573 secrets from FortiGate configurations, a zero-permission token theft flaw in Microsoft Authenticator (CVE-2026-80097), 42 hijacked GitHub repositories deploying npm supply-chain worms, and the n0n ransomware group leveraging AI coding agents with over $7,200 in model usage costs to attack 23 organizations across 14 countries. Banking malware-as-a-service (MR ROBOT), AI agent impersonation scanning for credentials at scale, and a Cohere-reported attempt by Alibaba's Qwen model to exfiltrate data to China further defined the threat landscape. This bulletin reflects an accelerating convergence of AI-assisted attack automation, identity and token-based exploitation, and software supply-chain abuse. Ransomware groups and extortion actors are industrializing operations using rented toolkits, AI coding assistants, and credential harvesting at scale, signaling a structural shift in attacker economics that demands equally systematic defensive responses across cloud, identity, and network layers.

Medium impact

Kill Chain

ICInitial Compromise(high)

PEPrivilege Escalation(high)

LMLateral Movement(high)

C&CCommand & Control(high)

EExfiltration(high)

IImpact(high)

Read report

Computer Software/Engineering2 days ago

The AI Relay in Your Dev Pipeline: How a Shadow Service Hijacked Codex and Claude Code at a Dozen Enterprises

In late October 2026, Symantec's Threat Hunter Team exposed a clandestine relay service that had been silently installing authentic OpenAI Codex and Anthropic Claude Code CLI tools across enterprise environments in mainland China, South Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia since early 2026. The service routes all AI agent traffic through attacker-controlled relay infrastructure, disables execution sandboxes, enables unrestricted network access for write operations, suppresses telemetry, and replaces corporate API credentials with relay-issued tokens. At least a dozen organizations were confirmed affected, none knowingly. The relay operator gains full visibility into every prompt, file, and secret transiting the agent, and can silently alter or fabricate every model response returned to the user. This incident crystallizes the emerging shadow AI threat class: employees bypassing geographic or procurement controls introduce unauthorized AI relay infrastructure that operates with the full privileges of a developer account. As agentic AI coding tools become core to software delivery pipelines, a single compromised relay can silently manipulate code, harvest secrets, and pivot across cloud workloads—making egress policy enforcement and supply-chain visibility critical board-level concerns heading into 2027.

High impact

Kill Chain

ICInitial Compromise(high)

PEPrivilege Escalation(high)

LMLateral Movement(medium)

C&CCommand & Control(high)

EExfiltration(high)

IImpact(medium)

Read report

Government Administration2 days ago

PHP2Shell + Fragnesia: How China-Nexus Attackers Rooted 25 Servers Through Exposed PAN-OS Management Interfaces

In late October 2026, threat actors actively exploited two critical PHP2Shell vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, CVSS 9.2) targeting internet-exposed Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS management interfaces, enabling unauthenticated remote code execution. A suspected China-nexus threat actor chained these flaws with a Linux kernel local privilege escalation bug (CVE-2026-46300, Fragnesia) to root 25 servers across the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea — including systems in a U.S. government-affiliated environment. Post-exploitation activity included PHP web shell implantation, Active Directory attacks, credential extraction, and directory enumeration, indicating deep persistence objectives. This campaign underscores the persistent danger of internet-exposed network appliance management interfaces, a vector increasingly favored by nation-state actors. The China-nexus attribution and targeting of government-adjacent infrastructure mirrors patterns seen in prior Salt Typhoon and Volt Typhoon operations, signaling an escalating trend of supply-chain and appliance-layer intrusions that bypass traditional endpoint defenses.

Critical impact

Kill Chain

ICInitial Compromise(high)

PEPrivilege Escalation(high)

LMLateral Movement(high)

C&CCommand & Control(high)

EExfiltration(medium)

IImpact(medium)

Read report

Defense/Space2 days ago

KeyDrift & CVE-2026-20127: How State-Linked Hackers Silently Stole Cisco SD-WAN Encryption Keys

In late 2025 and continuing through 2026, threat actors tracked as UAT-11473—with infrastructure overlapping the Volt Typhoon-linked Silent Train botnet—exploited CVE-2026-20127, a CVSS 10.0 authentication-bypass flaw in Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Controllers, Managers, and Validators. After gaining administrative access without credentials, attackers deployed custom malware called KeyDrift, whose LittleFilch component hooked into the vdaemon process to harvest AES-256 encryption key material exchanged between SD-WAN edge routers. Collected keys were RSA-encrypted and staged for exfiltration over UDP, enabling passive decryption of inter-site traffic. Targeted sectors included space, satellite, defense, aerospace, and policy research organizations. This campaign illustrates a maturing pattern among state-aligned threat actors: rather than noisily disrupting networks, adversaries silently harvest the cryptographic material that protects data in transit—effectively nullifying IPsec and SD-WAN encryption without touching the encrypted payload itself. As enterprises accelerate SD-WAN adoption across hybrid and multicloud environments, securing the control plane that manages encryption keys has become as critical as encrypting the data plane.

Critical impact

Kill Chain

ICInitial Compromise(high)

PEPrivilege Escalation(high)

LMLateral Movement(medium)

C&CCommand & Control(high)

EExfiltration(high)

IImpact(medium)

Read report

Defense/Space2 days ago

CVE-2026-76418: How Cisco's VPN Flaw Became an APT Doorway—and What to Do Now

In October 2026, Cisco disclosed active exploitation of CVE-2026-76418, a high-severity denial-of-service vulnerability (CVSS 8.6) in its Secure Firewall ASA and FTD Software. The flaw resides in the Remote Access SSL VPN service and is triggered by a crafted request to tunnel groups configured with secondary authentication, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to crash the device. Cisco simultaneously revealed that APT actor UAT-11473—assessed to share infrastructure with Volt Typhoon's Silent Train campaign—weaponized a related SD-WAN authentication bypass (CVE-2026-20127) to deploy the KeyDrift malware framework against defense, aerospace, and satellite sectors, enabling persistent access and automated exfiltration of cryptographic keying material. This incident underscores a sustained APT focus on network perimeter infrastructure—firewalls, VPN concentrators, and SD-WAN controllers—as high-value initial access targets. The pairing of a DoS-capable VPN flaw with a sophisticated persistent implant framework signals that nation-state actors are systematically mapping and undermining encrypted network boundaries, raising the risk profile for any organization relying on perimeter-centric security models.

Critical impact

Kill Chain

ICInitial Compromise(high)

PEPrivilege Escalation(high)

LMLateral Movement(medium)

C&CCommand & Control(high)

EExfiltration(high)

IImpact(high)

Read report

Information Technology/IT2 days ago

Inside Claude's Sandbox: How a Researcher Turned AI Prompts into Cloud Credential Theft

In a controlled research exercise published by Bishop Fox, security researcher Chris Davis systematically probed the sandbox environment surrounding Anthropic's Claude AI model, uncovering a chain of exposures spanning container internals, process memory, and live authorization tokens. Beginning with seemingly benign queries about the sandbox's operating environment, Davis was able to extract sensitive runtime artifacts that Claude surfaced during interaction. The investigation revealed that the model's execution context lacked adequate isolation controls, enabling an adversary to pivot from conversational access to credential harvesting—demonstrating a complete kill chain from initial prompt to exfiltration of bearer tokens usable against downstream cloud services. This research arrives as enterprises accelerate GenAI adoption with insufficient runtime security controls. Agentic AI deployments, where models autonomously call APIs and access internal systems, dramatically expand the attack surface. Security teams now face a new class of threat: sandbox escapes and token exfiltration via AI interaction rather than traditional exploit code.

Medium impact

Kill Chain

ICInitial Compromise(high)

PEPrivilege Escalation(high)

LMLateral Movement(medium)

C&CCommand & Control(medium)

EExfiltration(high)

IImpact(low)

Read report

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Security Research & Insights

Security Research & Insights with human-led deep dives into campaigns and cloud-native TTPs

All Research Articles

exec-13ea3b13-c046-4c3f-bdef-bfc6448ce51d

Four Minutes to PHP2Shell Shaped Traffic: What an Internet Exposed PHP Honeypot Saw

Matt Snyder

Oct 26, 202610 min read

Eight Certificates That Can Impersonate Anyone: The eMudhra Key Failure and Your Real Attack Surface

Matt Snyder

Oct 21, 202613 min read

php2shell: Two Critical PHP RCEs, a Pre-Patch Leak, and the PHP You Didn't Know You Had

Matt Snyder

Oct 21, 202615 min read

Market Perspectives

Market Perspectives offering expert commentary and select breach analysis from industry leaders

Read All Blogs

What Could Have Stopped the 2023 MGM Breach v4

Cloud Native Security Fabric

What Could Have Stopped the 2023 MGM Breach? A Study in the Power of Embedded Zero Trust

Cloud Network Security

John Qian

Jul 31, 20257 min read

Zero Trust

The Zero Trust Gap: Only 8% of US Enterprises Use Zero Trust Architectures

Scott Leatherman

Jul 23, 202512 min read

Cloud Network Security

HITRUST CSF Compliance in the Cloud—How Aviatrix Secures Healthcare Data

Tom Davis

Jun 25, 20257 min read

How CNSF Protects Cloud Workloads

Cloud attackers don’t rely on a single exploit — they rely on paths.

Once inside, attackers move laterally between workloads, establish command-and-control through egress paths, and exfiltrate data through legitimate cloud services — often before detection tools generate an alert. These paths exist because most security architectures enforce at centralized inspection points, not at every workload. The paths that matter most are the ones that never reach a central firewall.

Aviatrix Cloud Native Security Fabric (CNSF) contains attacks by enforcing policy at every workload communication path — containing blast radius, blocking lateral movement, and cutting off egress before data leaves the environment.

With CNSF, enterprises can:

Contain attack paths at runtime
Gain visibility into east-west and egress workload communication and apply controls that limit lateral movement, unauthorized egress, and uncontrolled trust expansion.
Eliminate blind spots in workload-to-workload traffic
Observe traffic across VPCs/VNets, regions, and cloud providers using cloud native telemetry — including paths that posture tools and point controls don’t model.
Secure modern and AI-driven workloads
Understand how agents, services, and workloads communicate at runtime, and enforce policy to reduce the risk of misuse, over-privileged access, or unintended data flows.
Apply consistent Zero Trust controls without slowing teams
Enforce segmentation, egress control, and encryption centrally across clouds — without agents, application changes, or developer friction.

See Your Attack Paths. Close the Gaps with CNSF.

Blast radius starts where your enforcement stops.

Most security architectures enforce at centralized inspection points. Attackers move between workloads on paths that never reach those points — building blast radius invisibly until detection tools fire, often too late.

The Executive Assistant That Broke the Company Why Shadow AI is the New Cloud Crisis card image

Your assessment delivers:

The Aviatrix Workload Attack Path Assessment (WAPA) analyzes real workload communication using cloud native telemetry to uncover attack paths already present in your environment — and shows how Cloud Native Security Fabric (CNSF) can break those paths with runtime enforcement.

Explore the Workload Attack Path Assessment

Containment Era Intelligence

The threat landscape has changed.
Has your question changed with it?

In March 2026, TeamPCP proved that detection-first architectures cannot contain attacks that move through trusted code, not around defenses. Today’s threat actors don’t break in — they log in, blend in, and expand silently. This command center tracks the evolving threat landscape and helps you measure your Blast Radius — the architectural metric that defines resilience in the Containment Era.

Interactive ToolOpen Threat Command Center Quick AssessmentAssess My Blast Radius

Tracked Campaigns

82%

Intrusions are malware-free

— CrowdStrike GTR 2026

29 min

Avg. eCrime breakout time

— CrowdStrike GTR 2026

27 sec

Fastest observed breakout

— CrowdStrike GTR 2026

This command center tracks 8 active campaigns and measures your Blast Radius: what an attacker can reach once inside your environment.

Contain the Blast Radius

See the attack paths already present in your environment — and where CNSF containment controls would break them.

Free Containment Assessment Under Active Attack?

Aviatrix Threat Research Center

Recent Breaches, Security Incidents & Vulnerabilities

AI-Powered Threat Analysis

How Agentic AI Breached Chainalysis: Inside the 2026 Intrusion Into Internal Tools and Customer Identity Data

How a Fake Claude Code Extension Turned Developer Workstations Into SSH Backdoor Relays

Vapor Panda Used Agentic AI to Compromise 140 Targets in 11 Days—Here Is What That Means for Your Cloud Security

AI-Powered ARTEX: How Vapor Panda Turned Agentic LLMs Into a Weapon Against 200+ Global Organizations

KeyDrift Malware: How APT Group UAT-11473 Hijacked Cisco SD-WAN to Steal Encryption Keys

Hugging Face GPU Hijack: How a Malicious AI Model Campaign Stole Cloud Compute at Scale

ThreatsDay October 2026: AI-Powered Ransomware, FortiBleed 2.0, Token Theft, and the New Economics of Cyberattack

The AI Relay in Your Dev Pipeline: How a Shadow Service Hijacked Codex and Claude Code at a Dozen Enterprises

PHP2Shell + Fragnesia: How China-Nexus Attackers Rooted 25 Servers Through Exposed PAN-OS Management Interfaces

KeyDrift & CVE-2026-20127: How State-Linked Hackers Silently Stole Cisco SD-WAN Encryption Keys

CVE-2026-76418: How Cisco's VPN Flaw Became an APT Doorway—and What to Do Now

Inside Claude's Sandbox: How a Researcher Turned AI Prompts into Cloud Credential Theft

Security Research & Insights

Four Minutes to PHP2Shell Shaped Traffic: What an Internet Exposed PHP Honeypot Saw

Eight Certificates That Can Impersonate Anyone: The eMudhra Key Failure and Your Real Attack Surface

php2shell: Two Critical PHP RCEs, a Pre-Patch Leak, and the PHP You Didn't Know You Had

Market Perspectives

What Could Have Stopped the 2023 MGM Breach? A Study in the Power of Embedded Zero Trust

The Zero Trust Gap: Only 8% of US Enterprises Use Zero Trust Architectures

HITRUST CSF Compliance in the Cloud—How Aviatrix Secures Healthcare Data

How CNSF Protects Cloud Workloads

With CNSF, enterprises can:

See Your Attack Paths. Close the Gaps with CNSF.

Your assessment delivers:

The threat landscape has changed.
Has your question changed with it?

Contain the Blast Radius

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Customer Stories

Solutions

Resources

Industry

Company

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Security & Legal

Aviatrix Threat Research Center

Recent Breaches, Security Incidents & Vulnerabilities

AI-Powered Threat Analysis

How Agentic AI Breached Chainalysis: Inside the 2026 Intrusion Into Internal Tools and Customer Identity Data

How a Fake Claude Code Extension Turned Developer Workstations Into SSH Backdoor Relays

Vapor Panda Used Agentic AI to Compromise 140 Targets in 11 Days—Here Is What That Means for Your Cloud Security

AI-Powered ARTEX: How Vapor Panda Turned Agentic LLMs Into a Weapon Against 200+ Global Organizations

KeyDrift Malware: How APT Group UAT-11473 Hijacked Cisco SD-WAN to Steal Encryption Keys

Hugging Face GPU Hijack: How a Malicious AI Model Campaign Stole Cloud Compute at Scale

ThreatsDay October 2026: AI-Powered Ransomware, FortiBleed 2.0, Token Theft, and the New Economics of Cyberattack

The AI Relay in Your Dev Pipeline: How a Shadow Service Hijacked Codex and Claude Code at a Dozen Enterprises

PHP2Shell + Fragnesia: How China-Nexus Attackers Rooted 25 Servers Through Exposed PAN-OS Management Interfaces

KeyDrift & CVE-2026-20127: How State-Linked Hackers Silently Stole Cisco SD-WAN Encryption Keys

CVE-2026-76418: How Cisco's VPN Flaw Became an APT Doorway—and What to Do Now

Inside Claude's Sandbox: How a Researcher Turned AI Prompts into Cloud Credential Theft

Security Research & Insights

Four Minutes to PHP2Shell Shaped Traffic: What an Internet Exposed PHP Honeypot Saw

Eight Certificates That Can Impersonate Anyone: The eMudhra Key Failure and Your Real Attack Surface

php2shell: Two Critical PHP RCEs, a Pre-Patch Leak, and the PHP You Didn't Know You Had

Market Perspectives

What Could Have Stopped the 2023 MGM Breach? A Study in the Power of Embedded Zero Trust

The Zero Trust Gap: Only 8% of US Enterprises Use Zero Trust Architectures

HITRUST CSF Compliance in the Cloud—How Aviatrix Secures Healthcare Data

How CNSF Protects Cloud Workloads

With CNSF, enterprises can:

See Your Attack Paths. Close the Gaps with CNSF.

Your assessment delivers:

The threat landscape has changed. Has your question changed with it?

Contain the Blast Radius

The threat landscape has changed.
Has your question changed with it?