Framework’s 2025 Secure Boot Bypass: How Signed UEFI Debug Tools Created a Supply-Chain Crisis
In October 2025, firmware security researchers revealed a supply-chain vulnerability affecting nearly 200,000 Framework Linux laptops, caused by the inclusion of signed UEFI shells with the powerful 'mm' (memory modify) command. This legitimate but dangerous command, intended for hardware debugging, could be used by attackers with local or physical access to bypass Secure Boot by overwriting memory critical to the boot process—disabling signature verification and enabling the loading of bootkits like BlackLotus or HybridPetya. The issue was not the result of an external compromise but a manufacturing oversight, impacting several Framework 13 and Framework 16 models, with firmware updates and mitigation guidance swiftly issued. This vulnerability highlights a growing risk in hardware supply-chain security, where trusted vendor-signed components can inadvertently enable sophisticated attacks that persist even after OS reinstalls. As attackers increasingly target firmware and boot processes, the incident underscores the urgency for robust device-level and manufacturing-time security controls.
Kill Chain